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BOOK REVIEW
WHO CARES? WHY BOTHER?: WHAT JEFF
POWELL AND MARK TUSHNET HAVE TO SAY
TO EACH OTHER
WILLIAM BREWBAKER*
CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT. Edited by Michael W.
McConnell, Robert F. Cochran, Jr., and Angela C. Carmella. New Haven: Yale
University Press. 2001. Pp. xxii, 510. $50.00.
Introduction
In 1993, H. Jefferson Powell wrote a book entitled The Moral Tradition of
American Constitutionalism.' Powell's book offers, among other things, "a Christian
theological perspective on the 'conceptual and moral quagmire' into which the
'American constitutional tradition has worked itself."'2 Mark Tushnet eventually
reviewed the book for the Journal of Legal Education. Although Tushnet's review
consumed only six pages, his reaction to the book can be summarized even more
briefly: "Who cares?" and "Why bother?"3 The review begins and ends with the
same question: "What can someone who does not already share Powell's perspective
gain from reading his book?"' ("Who cares?"). Tushnet also complains that Powell's
theological conclusions are insufficiently robust, suggesting that "the Enlightenment-
influenced pragmatist or even the thoroughly rationalistic Benthamite calculator"
might have reached the same conclusions.' ("Why bother?").
Tushnet's two questions will undoubtedly be on the minds of many who read
* Professor of Law, University of Alabama. I am grateful to Nicholas Aroney, Charles Gamble,
Susan Hamill. Kyle Logue, and David Skeel for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this review. Dean
Ken Randall and the University of Alabama Law School Foundation provided generous research support,
including a sabbatical leave during which a substantial portion of this paper was written. I am indebted
to the Master and Fellows of St. Edmund's College, Cambridge, to the Faculty of Law of the University
of Cambridge, and most especially to the Warden and Members of Tyndale House for their hospitality
and support.
1. H. JEFFERSON PowEi., THE MORAL TRADMON OF AMERICAN CONSTrIrTmoNALISM (1993).
2. Mark V. Tushnet, Book Review, 45 J. LEGAL EDUc. 303, 303 (quoting POwELL, supra note 1,
at 7).
3. Tushnet also criticizes Powell's use of Justice Holmes' dissent in Lochner v. New York, id. at 305,
concludes that Powell "offers some insightful criticisms" of contemporary constitutional law theory, id.,
and offers an alternative to Powell's narrative of the constitutional tradition, id. at 306.
4. Id. at 303; see also id. at 308 ("Except as it provides information about a particular perspective,
what can someone not within that tradition gain from reading Powell's book?").
5. Id. at 307.
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Michael McConnell, Robert Cochran, and Angela Carmella's new book, Christian
Perspectives on Legal Thought (CPLT). Self-consciously an attempt to "break [the]
silence"7 of Christians in the legal academy, CPLT is both an apology for the
enterprise of Christian legal scholarship and an illustration of the difference
explicitly Christian presuppositions might make, and have made, in legal analysis
and political theory. It is also a preliminary attempt at recovering a largely forgotten
tradition of faith-informed political and jurisprudential reflection and, implicitly, an
invitation to renewed discussion within the Christian community on the implications
of faith for the legal order.
CPLTs intended audience includes not only Christian lawyers and legal scholars,
but also the wider legal academy. Part I of the book provides various Christian
reactions to six influential schools of contemporary legal thought - Enlightenment
liberalism, legal realism, critical legal studies, critical race theory, feminism, and
economic analysis of law. Part II provides short treatments of the place of law and
politics within the Catholic, Calvinist, Anabaptist, Baptist, and Lutheran Christian
traditions. Part III includes examples of Christian approaches to conventional legal
subjects, including torts, contracts, criminal law, family law, environmental law, and
legal ethics.
This book review is organized primarily around Tushnet's two questions. Part I
discusses CPLTs attempts to answer the question of why legal scholarship based
on an explicitly Christian analytical framework should interest legal scholars
generally. Part II draws upon the essays in CPLT to consider whether faith-
informed legal scholarship is, or should be, expected to be robust in the sense of
yielding insightful approaches to legal issues. Part I evaluates CPLTs efforts to
assist scholars in recovering Christian traditions of political and jurisprudential
reflection. CPLT contains nearly thirty separate essays; I have not attempted to
provide an overview of each one. Instead, I discuss selected essays that seem
important and representative in an attempt to give the reader a sense of the book's
overall concerns.
. Who Cares?: Is Christianity Relevant to Contemporary Legal Thought?
Regardless of the specific merit or demerit of CPLT, the prospect of legal
scholarship that is explicitly and self-consciously informed by Christian belief will
dismay many within the legal academy. One can imagine a variety of negative
reactions. Some may regard Christian legal scholarship as a bizarre exercise in
irrationality or superstition, akin to offering an analysis of American law from the
perspective of numerology or Zoroastrianism. Such individuals might thus conclude
6. CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001)
[hereinafter CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES].
7. Michael W. McConnell et al., Introduction, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 6, at xvii,
Xviii.
8. Tushnet's review, discussed above, compares Powell's perspective on constitutional law to that
of "self-styled constitutionalist tax protesters," which certainly suggests more than a hint of skepticism
about its intellectual merit. See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 303 n. I. Tushnet is not alone in his negative
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that they are not interested in CPLT because the claims of Christianity' are, in their
opinion, simply false. Indeed, some might even go so far as to insist that analysis
based on such "falsehoods" has no place in the academy, where scholars should
measure opinions by accepted standards of evidence and rationality.'" Others may
resist the project of a specifically Christian legal scholarship because they think that
giving Christian arguments a public hearing is bad politics." Or, they might, as
Tushnet seems to do with respect to Powell's book, simply dismiss Christian
perspectives as inherently uninteresting, without taking a position on the epistemic
or other merits of Christian faith. 2
A. Christian Belief and Rationality
CPLT is not a work of Christian apologetics and is thus not primarily concerned
with arguing for the reasonableness of Christian faith or refuting objections thereto.
Not surprisingly, however, the question of intellectual warrant is never far below the
surface of the book's essays. The main approach taken by CPLTs editors and
contributors is not to mount a defense of Christian belief, but rather to emphasize that
all legal scholarship is situated from someone's contestable intellectual perspective.'3
Following that view, it is wrong to characterize faith-based scholarship as "biased,"
while labeling secular viewpoints as "objective" and "scientific.""' The editors note
visceral reaction to Christian scholarship. One political scientist has observed that
[ilf a professor talks about studying something from a Marxist point of view, others might
disagree but not dismiss the notion. But if a professor proposed to study something from
a Catholic or Protestant point of view, it would he treated like proposing something from
a Martian point of view.
GEORGE H. MARSDEN, THE OUTRAGEOUS IDEA OF CHRISTIAN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 7 (1997) (quoting
Peter Steinfels, Universities BiasedAgairtt Religion, Scholar Says, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 26, 1993, at A22)
(statement of John C. Green); cf Suzanna Sherry, Outlaw Blues, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1418, 1427 (1989)
("[S]uch things as divine revelation and biblical literalism are irrational, superstitious nonsense .....
9. E.g., Jesus is God incarnate; Jesus was raised from the dead.
10. See infra Part 1.A.
I1. See infra Part 1.B.
12. See infra Part I.C.
13. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, A Century of Skepticism, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note
6, at 94 (noting this fact in the context of arguing for a coherentist account of the rationality of
Christianity).
14. McConnell et al., supra note 7, at xxi. The editors also argue that "the notion that law is or can
be a science was discredited long ago. Underlying the law of any culture will be the pretheoretical
beliefs of that culture. Those beliefs are necessarily rooted in culture, tradition, identity and other sources
of conviction." Id. These statements follow a reference to Dean Christopher Langdell's attempt to
develop a "science of law." Id. at xx. If by this the editors merely mean to suggest that very few people
would be interested in a Langdellian conception of legal science, the statement is obviously true.
However, a statement that laws rest on a culture's pretheoretical beliefs might be presented as an
important element in an account of law that purported to be "scientific" in the sense of being merely
descriptive. See, e.g, H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 26-49 (2d ed. 1994) (arguing for the necessity
of understanding a culture's "internal perspective" on law). On the non-neutrality of "mere" description,
however, see JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 3-22 (1980); see also JOHN MILBANK,
THEOLOGY AND SOCIAL THEORY (1990).
Even assuming that a value-free account of law were possible, it is not the current practice of most
2002]
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that
legal thought is now ... open to diverse voices and perspectives, not
all of them "rational" in any narrow "Enlightenment" sense of that
term.... If the world of the legal academy is to be truly inclusive, if
we are to have a broad-based conversation about our lives together,
religious people and religious ideas need to be part of that conver-
sation.'"
This argument is based less on a theologically informed standard of what ought
to count as good scholarship than on current practice within the legal academy.
"Rationality" has become a problematic gatekeeper for entry into academic
discourse, because most of us now recognize that there is no single, universally
acceptable account of what qualifies as "rational." Nevertheless, CPLTs appeal to
inclusiveness comes with its own set of potential problems. As discussed below, for
Christians, inclusiveness in the academic conversation must be motivated by respect
and epistemic humility on all sides, rather than by the denial of the possibility of
truth. 6
B. The Politics of Christian Belief
CPLTs editors are likewise aware of the political apprehensions likely to
accompany the re-introduction of Christian thought into legal discourse. In CPLTs
introduction, they note three specific concerns: (1) the prospect that specifically
religious argumentation will breed civic disunity; (2) "a fear that [self-consciously
Christian voices in the legal conversation today] would be the opening wedge in a
program to reassert Christian hegemony";"' and (3) suspicions that "a Christian view
of law will yield an authoritarian conservative regime, to the detriment of gay
rights, abortion rights, women's rights, children's rights, and 'progressive' causes of
all sorts."'"
While McConnell, Cochran, and Carmella provide plausible reasons to suppose
that fears of adverse political consequences are inadequate to justify marginalizing
Christian perspectives on law,"9 the actual samples of Christian scholarship in the
legal academics to limit themselves to the task of describing law in a purportedly neutral way. On the
contrary, most law professors are more than prepared to offer suggestions about legal reform, to argue
for a particular interpretation of various laws on the basis of contestable theories of legal interpretation,
and to argue for the selection of some policies over others. In this setting, the absence of a neutral,
pretheoretical ground is important.
15. McConnell et al., supra note 7, at xxi. Christians nevertheless may be wise to keep some
distance between themselves and "perspectivalism." See infra Part I.C. For an insightful critique of
Professor McConnell's pluralist position, see generally OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF
FAITH 111-95 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 2000) (contributions by Graham Walker, Amy Gutmann, and
Nancy L. Rosenblum). See aLo CHRISTOPHER J. EBERLE, RELIGIOUS CONVICTnON IN LIBERAL POLITICS
(2002) (defending religiously motivated political speech).
16. See infra Part I.C.
17. McConnell et al., supra note 7, at xx.
18. Id. at xxi.
19. Specifically, the editors argue that "Christians can be found at most points in the ideological
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book will probably provide more comfort to the politically skeptical reader than
editorial assertions. The essays, which were taken from presentations at the annual
Law Professors' Christian Fellowship Conference over a period of several years,
rather than being primarily solicited for the book, represent a wide spectrum of
political opinion. Indeed, the book suggests that Christian legal scholars are found
in almost every comer of the legal academy. CPLT contains essays that are, by and
large, supportive of critical race theory,"° law and economics,' liberal political
arrangements,2 the LatCrit movement,' and feminist legal theory.' There is little
spectrum," and they note that "evangelical Christians have been in the forefront of 'progresive' causes
like abolition, women's suffrage, and universal educa-tion - as well as 'conservative' causes like
Prohibition and the restoration of 'family values,"' and that the "Catholic Church in America has been
a vigorous opponent of capital punishment and a warm supporter of labor, social welfare, and
immigration, as well as a supporter of protections against abortion and euthanasia." Id. Moreover, "even
if religious voices were reliably antithetical to a particular brand of progressive politics, democrats (with
a small d) should recognize that it is unprincipled and undemocratic to exclude or marginalize fellow
citizens on the mere expectation that they will vote the wrong way." Id.
20. See W. Burlette Carter, What's Love Got to Do with It? Race Relations and the Second Great
Commandment, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 6, at 133; Davison M. Douglas, Reinhold
Niebuhr and Critical Race Theory, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 6. at 149.
21. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Law and Economics: An Apologia, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 6, at 208. But see George E. Garvey, A Catholic Social Teaching Critique of Law and
Economics, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 6, at 224.
22. See Stephen Carter, Liberal Hegemony and Religious Resistance: An Essay on Legal Theory,
in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 6, at 25; Michael W. McConnell, Old Liberalism, New
Liberalism and People of Faith, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 6, at 5; Elizabeth Mensch,
Christianity and the Roots of Liberalism, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 6, at 54; H. Jefferson
Powell, The Earthly Peace of the Liberal Republic, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 6, at 73.
23. See Jose Roberto Juarez, Jr., Hispanics, Catholicism and the Legal Academy, in CHRISTIAN
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 6, at 163.
24. See Teresa Stanton Collett, Independence or Interdependence? A Christian Response to Liberal
Feminists, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 6, at 178; Leslie Griffin, Citizen-Soldiers are Like
Priests: Feminism in Law and Theology, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 6, at 194.
David Caudill's essay is sympathetically critical of the critical legal studies (CLS) movement. See
David S. Caudill, Law and Belief: Critical Legal Studies and Philosophy of the Law-Idea, in CHRISTIAN
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 6, at 109. He finds common ground between Dutch Calvinist legal philosophy
and critical legal studies' emphasis on disclosure of "the inevitable tilt in all theory, including legal
doctrine," id. at 119, even as he notes that the "faithlike commitments that a [Dutch Calvinist legal
philosopher] wants to disclose are rampant in CLS," id. at 129. Caudill argues further that emphasizing
disclosure of pretheoretical commitments could help rescue CLS from the common criticism that its
"program is destructive, because things are torn down and nothing is put in their place." Id. at 128.
According to Caudill:
Such criticism of CLS, common in law reviews, misses an important point. If every social
community is a community of believers whose ideas and practices are based upon and
driven by ideology, then genuine communication and debate can begin only with
awareness and acknowledgment of that situation. The self-critical program of CLS
consists of disclosing tilt without denying the foundational presuppositions giving rise to
both the critique and whatever solutions are offered.
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"take America back" rhetoric in CPLT;2, 5 indeed, some of the more recognizably
conservative voices in the book seem to want mainly to be left alone.'
On the other hand, a few of the essays offer a rather strident critique of the
politics of American legal culture. Albert Alschuler's contribution is sharply critical
of the worldview underlying much of contemporary legal theory. In a contribution
entitled A Century of Skepticism, Alschuler argues that "[tihe left and the right in
American legal thought . . . are united in their skepticism, especially their
skepticism concerning values,""7 with the result that contemporary American legal
theory is infected with "[t]he vices of atomism, alienation, ambivalence, self-
centeredness, and vacuity of commitment [that] appear characteristic of our
culture. '
While Stephen Carter offers a general endorsement of "[tihe liberalism of the
enlightenment," 9 he also has harsh words for modem liberal theory's patronizing
treatment of religion:
The basic response of liberal theory to religiosity is to try to speak
words that seem to celebrate it (as a part of the freedom of belief, or
conscience, or the entitlement to select one's own version of the good)
while in effect trying to domesticate it ... or, if that fails, to try to
destroy it."°
Michael McConnell finds contemporary liberalism's abandonment of its
commitment to limited government particularly troubling. Borrowing John Rawls'
distinction, McConnell observes that liberalism has ceased being a "political"
25. While Michael McConnell says that Christians should "take [liberalism] back," McConnell,
supra note 22, at 24, his essay contains no suggestion that Christians should have the goal of reasserting
political control over American institutions, infra text accompanying notes 32-34.
26. See, e.g., Richard F. Duncan, On Liberty and Life in Babylon: A Pilgrim's Pragmatic Proposal,
in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIvES, supra note 6, at 354. For Duncan, being let alone includes the "demand
that our government let our children go - without penalty." id. at 362. He states:
In a free and just society, government has no business commandeering an audience of
impressionable children for inculcation in the ideas, beliefs, perspectives, and attitudes of
those who hold the reins of political power. The government is free to speak and celebrate
whatever it chooses. But it suppresses the fundamental freedoms of thought and belief
formation when it requires our children to show up and pay attention to its messages.
Id. at 361.
27. Alschuler, supra note 13, at 94.
28. Id. at 100.
29. Carter, supra note 22, at 30. The author states:
The liberalism of the Enlightenment... is generally compatible with a Christian view of
the world. Christianity is not, in its essence, opposed to representative democracy, to a
regime of individual rights, or to the principle that we should, for the most part, be left
alone by the state so that we can pursue individual visions of the good. Quite the
contrary: Christianity probably could not survive in the absence of these fundamental
assumptions of liberal democracy.
30. Id. at 29.
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philosophy and has become a "comprehensive" ideology." He notes that "[tioday
there is a widespread sense that not only should the government be neutral, tolerant
and egalitarian, but so should all of us, and so should our private associations."32
The extended regulatory sweep of the welfare state and the "conflation of 'neutrality'
and 'secularism' make matters worse, particularly with respect to the threats they
pose to religious freedom.3 Nevertheless, McConnell traces the origins of liberal
political arrangements to Christian thought, advocating a return to an earlier, more
limited version of liberalism.' In this chastened form, liberalism is, McConnell
argues, "the form of government most consistent with the gospel, and most
conducive to living in harmony with God and our neighbors." 5
C. Is Christian Scholarship "Interesting"?
As noted above, a final possible negative reaction to Christian scholarship is
simply to dismiss it as uninteresting. Indeed, Tushnet does this when he wonders
whether anyone who does not share Jeff Powell's perspective will gain anything by
reading Powell's book.' The idea that a perspective is uninteresting or that there
is "nothing to gain" from encountering it might mean a number of different things.
It might mean, for example, that the speaker regards the perspective as fundamental-
ly false or misguided in some way and, as such, unlikely to be the source of
possible insight into the rdlevant subject. 7 To say that a perspective or a particular
work is uninteresting might also mean that the speaker finds it unentertaining or,
more importantly, unoriginal.
A more significant use of these labels, however, might be made by those who
would be unwilling to say that Christianity, or any other perspective, is either true
or false because they associate such statements with Enlightenment pretensions of
having articulated "a universal point of view that the rational person can reach and
from there deliver final truth for us all."" They might thus feel no need to consider
seriously Christian truth claims and, further, might see no intellectual dishonesty (or
even laziness) in dismissing Christian perspectives as uninteresting without
considering the arguments for Christian belief.
Given the rather high incidence of this sort of thinking in the legal academy, it
is surprising that CPLT does not squarely address this challenge to the enterprise of
Christian legal scholarship. Perhaps the editors think (as I do) that it is utterly
implausible to suppose that Christianity is not false but not interesting either. If, for
31. McConnell, supra note 22, at 17-20.
32. Id. at 18-19.
33. Id. at 20-24. Stephen Carter makes a similar point. See Carter, supra note 22, at 31-32 ("Every
theory of the state - at least when put into practice - tends toward hegemony. When theory becomes
law, it becomes power, and power works to sustain itself.").
34. McConnell, supra note 22, at 24.
35. Id.
36. See supra text accompanying note 4.
37. See supra Part I.A.
38. Diogenes Allen, Christianity and the Creed of Postmudernism, 23 CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR'S REV.
117, 124 (1993).
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example, one takes the prospect of divine judgment seriously, it is difficult to
imagine that Christianity's offer of deliverance from that judgment is "uninteresting."
One suspects that this posture of "disinterest" is merely a substitute way of saying
what some speakers might feel unable to say without undermining their own stated
beliefs - viz., that Christianity is false (in the ordinary sense of the word),
misguided, or both. To condemn Christian belief as false might be viewed as
inconsistent with a presupposition of the nonexistence of truth or unavailability of
universal standards by which one might determine "misguidedness." It may be more
useful, and seemingly beyond challenge, to say that the perspective is "unintere-
sting."
Taken seriously, a posture of "disinterest" conflicts with the whole idea of
academic discourse. If scholars are entitled to ignore arguments without recourse
to something beyond personal interest, the truth-seeking function of academic
discourse ceases. I am well aware that many in the academy would happily deny
that there is, or ever could have been, a truth-seeking function in academic
discourse. Yet, one wonders what such a statement could possibly mean. Does it
mean that there is no such thing as "the way things are"3 and that scholarship is
not now, and could never have been, about understanding the world in which we
live? Or, is it only the rather mundane claim that only God has a God's-eye view
of the world and that, as a result, many disputes will remain unsettled? The latter
claim has the virtue of being more plausible than the former, but, taken alone, it
does not justify radical skepticism about the prospect of learning anything true about
the world.'
Presumably, non-Christian scholars will take an interest in legal scholarship
written from an identifiably Christian perspective for the same reasons they are
interested in other obviously perspectival scholarship. As a practical matter, scholars
of differing perspectives often learn from each other, regardless of whether they
ultimately make converts to their particular school of thought. A contracts scholar
who is a Kantian liberal might come to see the doctrine of promissory estoppel
somewhat differently after reading the works of lawyer-economists, feminists, or
critical race theorists, regardless of whether the experience changes the fundamental
character of his research agenda. Such learning might take place in a number of
different ways - another scholar's perspective may lead one to ask new factual or
historical questions about a legal doctrine or its consequences; the other perspective
may help generate a critique of some part of the conventional wisdom about the
doctrine that prompts rethinking that wisdom; or the perspective may provide a
critique of the morality of the doctrine that prompts a rethinking of that doctrine.
Indeed, one may sometimes learn more from those with whom one profoundly
disagrees than from those with whom one is in easy accord, even if the "learning"
only further refines one's own position."'
39. ALVIN PLANTINGA, WARRANTED CHRISTIAN BELIEF 425 (2000).
40. Id. ("Postmoderns sometimes seem to oscillate between a momentous but clearly false claim
(there simply is no such thing as truth at all) and a sensible but rather boring claim (there is no such
thing as truth, conceived in some particular and implausible way).").
41. For one theological account of why we are right to be optimistic about academic debate in a
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II. Why Bother?: Can Legal Scholarship Ever Be Distinctively Christian?
Even if one is not prepared to dismiss out of hand the enterprise of faith-informed
scholarship, it remains to be seen whether such scholarship has anything distinctive
to contribute. If "the Enlightenment-influenced pragmatist or ... the thoroughly
rationalistic Benthamite calculator" could just as easily produce the same work as
the Christian scholar, why inject off-putting God-talk into public deliberation?
CPLTs claims for theologically informed scholarship, at bottom, are rather
modest. The book frequently highlights the complexity of the relationship between
theology and law. Thus, contributors not only are generally careful to state that they
are offering merely a Christian view of their subject, rather than the Christian view,
but they also generally agree that law should not embody each and every demand
of Christian morality.
Indeed, two of CPLTs contributors argue that there are at least two sets of
questions that must be confronted in deciding whether laws ought to be enacted.
These questions are not articulated rigorously, but seem to be roughly: (I) What
does ethics require? (2) What does a Christian view of politics and law suggest
about whether and how this ethical demand ought to be translated into law or other
governmental action? In one of two contributions to CPLT, David Caudill writes:
If we consider homosexuality - and I could just as easily choose
abortion or animal rights... - some Christians may theorize that it
should be discouraged or prohibited by the government because of their
belief that it is condemned in the Bible. But I might say that that is a
bad political theory, and I might propose a [Christian] political theory,
for our pluralistic society, recommending not just that the government
should be tolerant - for tolerance implies passive condemnation - but
that the government should not be meddling in family and sexual life."2
Caudill argues that the Bible "does not function as a set of theories"; as a result,
"Christian scholars may disagree as to the Christian view of politics or law, and
they will not always be able to refer to the Bible for answers.""3
pluralistic setting, see Richard John Neuhaus, Why We Can Get Along, FIRST THINGS, Feb. 1996, at 27.
42. David S. Caudill, A Calvinist Perspective on the Place of Faith in Legal Scholarship, in
CHRIsTIAN PERSPECTIvES, supra note 6, at 307, 315-16. As Caudill notes, "This example highlights [a]
neo-Calvinist conception ... termed sphere sovereignty, which implies that families and schools and
churches occupy spheres of authority that are distinct from the government and from each other." Id. at
316. For a defense of homosexual marriage from a neo-Calvinist perspective, see Julia Stronks,
Christians, Public Policy And Same-Sex Marriage: Framing The Questions Before We Shout Out The
Answers, 26 CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR'S REV. 540 (1997); for a neo-Calvinist defense of limiting marriage
to heterosexual couples, see DAVID ORGON COOUDOE, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE? (Crossroads Monograph
Series on Faith and Public Policy 1996).
Caudill argues that similar difficulties also afflict secular theories of law. See Caudill, supra, at 315-
43. Caudill, supra note 42, at 315.
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John Nagle's essay on environmental law also illustrates this view of the
relevance of Christian doctrine for legal scholarship. Nagle begins by asking "What
is the distinctively Christian message about environmental law? How would
environmental law be different if it were purposely founded on Christian prin-
ciples?"" His attempt to answer these questions begins with theology; he identifies
eight specific themes related to God's creation of the earth."' Nagle is quick to
acknowledge, however, that it does not end there. Not only do the theological
themes themselves suggest important further questions to consider,' but "[a]
Christian approach to environmental law must be based. . . on a Christian view of
law." 7 Not surprisingly, he does not present his analysis as the Christian perspec-
tive on environmental law; rather, he presents it as his best effort to consider
environmental law issues as a Christian."
Nagle's Christian consideration of current issues in environmental law leads him
to two categorical conclusions and several more modest judgments about current
policy debates. One categorical judgment is that justice involves a "duty to care for
the elderly, the sick, and all of those whose ability to care for themselves is
impaired."' A second is that "the Christian view of creation [is] theocentric -
God centered - rather than biocentric (all creatures are created equal) or
anthropocentric (humans are at the apex of the world)."' While "[bliblical teaching
44. John Copeland Nagle, Christianity and Environmental Law, in CHRISTnAN PERSPECrIVES, supra
note 6, at 435, 438 [hereinafter Nagle, Environmental Law].
45. Nagle summarizes his themes under the following headings: "God Created the World"; "God
Pronounced the Creation to Be Good"; "God is the Owner of All Creation"; "God Gave Humanity
Dominion over Creation"; "God Charged Men and Women with the Responsibility of Caring for
Creation"; "God Alone Is Worthy of Worship"; "Creation Has Suffered the Effects of the Entry of Sin
into the World"; and "God Will Redeem His Creation." Id. at 438-41.
46. The author states:
This perspective yields a number of questions. What is the relation between humanity and
other creatures? When do human needs justify actions that are harmful to the rest of
creation? When must people make sacrifices for the good of the rest of creation? When
must people sacrifice so that other people can better enjoy the goodness of creation? What
significance do the utilitarian arguments for environmental protection have for Christians?
Id. at 442.
47. The author states:
These theories generate another group of questions when they are applied to the specific
role of the legal system in protecting creation. When is it appropriate to write Christian
environmental principles into statutory law? Can Christian teachings about creation be
expressed through secular terms so that they are acceptable to those who are not
Christians? When should those of other (or no) religious faiths be commanded to respect
creation in the way suggested by Christian teaching? Who should bear the burden of
environmental protection efforts?
Id.
48. The author states, "I cannot hope to answer all of these questions here. What I shall attempt
instead is to explain how one Christian - namely, me - tries to take the Christian teaching on creation
and a Christian understanding of law and apply them to several current problems in environmental law."
Id.
49. Id. at 449.
50. Id. at 442-43.
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anticipates that people will rely upon animals and plants for food, clothing, and
other needs[,] [t]hat teaching also indicates . . . that God cares for the rest of
creation and expects us to care for it."" Christians do not believe "that every form
of life has an equal right to exist,"'" but they must also ask "which places [they]
are leaving for other members of God's creation.'s
Nagle draws on the first judgment to "applaud... attention ... to the effects of
pollution on poor and minority communities."' He draws on the second to support
mandatory (i.e., legal as opposed to voluntary) measures to preserve species
habitat."' Yet, Nagle also is concerned for the interests of landowners bearing the
brunt of endangered species legislation. Nagle supports both voluntary efforts to
compensate affected landowners and "narrowly focused takings legislation that seeks
to compensate.., landowners when 'unanticipated regulations destroy a significant
portion of the total assets of a property owner.""' Nagle finds this solution
attractive, but not necessarily unique. Although he supports this solution biblically,
the solution itself does not "depend upon exclusively Christian principles."'"
Rather, it "seeks to simultaneously accommodate the biblical concern about
protecting wildlife and preserving species, the practical need to protect habitat, and
the general principles of equity and justice that prevent the government from placing
a disproportionate burden on any individuals.""'
All this may reassure those who might have assumed that Christian legal
scholarship would involve nothing more than advocacy of a direct transfer of
Scriptural precepts into the statute books. But, one might ask (as Tushnet implicitly
does of Powell) why one would bother injecting controversial religious beliefs into
legal debates if these beliefs fail to yield robust conclusions as to the practical
decisions that are the ultimate objects of legal inquiry?
CPLT answers this objection primarily by letting the essays in the book speak for
themselves. Indeed, Part III includes contributions on contract law, environmental
law, family law, tort law, criminal law, and professional ethics. There is more to
be said on the subject, however.' All scholars bring certain contestable back-
ground beliefs to their scholarship,' and, depending on the work that is being done
and the scholar who is doing the work, these beliefs will be more or less evident
to the reader. Such beliefs likely influence the arguments the scholar finds
persuasive and the questions he thinks it important to ask.6' As George Marsden
5 I. Id. at 443. For an elaboration of a biblical case for the obligation to protect endangered species,
see John Copeland Nagle, Playing Noah, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1171, 1217-30 (1998).
52. Nagle, Environmental Law, supra note 44, at 443.
53. Id. at 444.
54. Id. at 450-51.
55. Id. at 445.
56. Id. at 449 (quoting William Michael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, the Narratives of
Takings, and Compensation Statutes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1151, 1155 (1997)).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. For a general treatment of Christian scholarship, see MARSDEN, supra note 8.
60. For an influential account of the influence of "control beliefs" on scholarship, see NICHOLAS
WOLTERSTORFF, REASON WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF RELIGION (2d ed. 1984).
6 1. See MARSDEN, supra note 8, at 65 ("'Christianity does not so much supply the learned person
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has written, "One would hardly argue that because virtually any question or
scholarly agenda that might be proposed by a Marxist scholar could be posed by a
non-Marxist that therefore a distinctive Marxism was not shaping the scholar-
ship."'
Many of the contributions to CPLT demonstrate these rather indirect effects of
Christian faith. Not surprisingly, issues of church and state have attracted Christian
legal scholars, and Michael McConnell's and Stephen Carter's respective
contributions reflect this interest and expertise. 3 Many of the contributions to
CPLT also reflect an interest in tracing the Christian roots of current legal and
political concepts. Elizabeth Mensch, for example, traces the paradoxical historical
relationship between Enlightenment liberalism and Christianity." Marci A.
Hamilton notes the application of Calvinist concepts in the framing of the American
Constitution.' These works will presumably be useful to legal historians or to
scholars wanting a greater understanding of American liberalism, whatever their
faith commitments.
In other cases, the challenges that CPLTs contributors make to conventional
thinking about various subjects evidence the contributors' Christian viewpoints more
directly.' Phillip Johnson, for example, provides a provocative account of the
development of the insanity defense.' Johnson begins by making clear the
naturalistic presuppositions of modern psychiatry:
[In the view of modem psychiatryJ human behavior, like all other
natural phenomena, is caused. From a scientific materialist point of view,
it is virtually meaningless to say that a person "chose" to commit a
particular action. What is important is to understand what combination
of genetic or environmental circumstances caused him to commit this
action rather than a different one. In the more logically rigorous versions
of this model, the human subject itself - the "I" in "I choose" - is
taken to be merely a placeholder for causative factors that we do not yet
understand.... Blame and retributive punishment are seen as relics of
with answers as it does raise questions.'") (quoting Robert Wuthnow, Living the Question, in
CHRISTIANITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: REFLECTIONS ON THE CHALLENGES AHEAD 209 (1993)).
Marsden also argues that Christian belief may affect scholarship by motivating scholars to work hard and
do their work well, by helping determine the applications scholars see for their scholarship, by "help[ing]
shape a sub-field, specialty, or questions one asks about one's work," or by influencing how the scholar
"sees the field, or its assumptions, fitting into a larger framework of meaning." Id. at 63-64.
62. Id. at 69.
63. See Carter, supra note 22; McConnell, supra note 22.
64. Mensch, supra note 22.
65. See Marci A. Hamilton, The Calvinist Paradox of Distrust and Hope at the Constitutional
Convention, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 6, at 293.
66. See MARSDEN, supra note 8, at 63-65 (arguing that faith influences scholarship by setting
research agendas).
67. Phillip E. Johnson, Human Nature and Criminal Responsibility: The Biblical View Restored, in
CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 6, at 426.
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prescientific superstition, premised on a view of human nature that
science has discarded."
He then argues that the old M'Naghten insanity test, which focused on whether the
defendant was capable of knowing what he was doing and, if so, whether it was
wrong,' "finds its metaphysical support in biblical theism, not scientific
materialism" because it "conclusively presumed that human adults have freedom to
choose between good and evil" and because it turned not on whether the defendant
knew his conduct was prohibited by law, but on whether he knew the conduct was
morally wrong.'
Johnson recounts the story of M'Naghten's replacement by standards based on the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code. These standards permitted an insanity
defense if either the defendant lacked the capacity "to appreciate the wrongfulness
of his conduct" or if the defendant lacked "substantial capacity ... to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law."7' Johnson argues that the Model Penal Code
test (and similar contemporaneous standards) "reflect[] a philosophical position
called 'soft determinism,' which is best described as an uneasy halfway house
between the scientific model (behavior is caused) and the common-law model
(behavior is chosen)."' Surprisingly, however, after experimenting with the Model
Penal Code and other similar tests, Congress and many state courts have reverted
to tests more closely resembling M'Naghten.
What is most interesting for Johnson about the demise of the Model Penal Code
test is not the fact of its rejection, but rather the psychiatric community's "enthusia-
stic agree[ment]" with its rejection.' The American Psychiatric Association (APA)
(whose reports have influenced the legal community) has not changed its
fundamental position that "'psychiatry is a deterministic discipline that views all
human behavior as, to a good extent, 'caused'."'7 4 Why, then, Johnson wonders,
"does the APA continue to say that there should be a defense for those defendants
who lack free will if nobody has free will? And what scientific content does the
concept of 'wrongfulness' have?""
68. Id. at 427.
69. The author states:
According to the M'Naghten rule, an accused is excused from criminal punishment (but
usually remitted to civil commitment) only if "at the time of committing the act, the party
accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not
know he was doing what was wrong."
Id. (quoting United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 608 (2d Cir. 1966)).
70. Id. at 428.
71. Id. at 429 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1974)).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 431-32.
74. Id. at 432 (quoting American Psychiatric Association, Statement on the Insanity Defense, 140
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 6 (1983)).
75. Id.
20021
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2002
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
Johnson argues that the APA's embarrassing position is the result of the
limitations of psychiatric science and "the inherent shortcomings of the attempt to
understand human nature and the human predicament in exclusively scientific
categories."'7 The psychiatrists themselves have found that they cannot live with
laws based on the account of human nature that they have bequeathed to us.
Beneath the surface of Johnson's essay (but only barely) is the suggestion that much
of what passes for rational, detached argumentation today is incoherent: it is
emphatically dismissive of religion, yet cannot finally free itself from religious
presuppositions both as to the world's order and as to its externally given meaning.
Jeff Powell's contribution to CPLT likewise challenges conventional thinking;
indeed, he begins by challenging the entire enterprise of social criticism." Powell
draws on Augustine's argument, in The City of God, that classical Roman social
critics were "moral[ly unable] or unwilling[] ... to achieve true critical distance from
their society."'" Because their critique of Roman society "depended for its effective-
ness on a fundamentally positive evaluation of society and the state," it was doomed
to "eventuate either in social nihilism, perhaps tinged by nostalgia, or in the
celebration of a renovated status quo."" Augustine, says Powell, finds that "[e]ven
the greatest of the pagan critics ultimately succumbed to the temptation to do one or
the other because they lacked an ultimately critical - because ultimately truthful -
theological perspective. '
Powell argues that contemporary critics of American politics are in a similar
situation." Today's critics of "rights talk," of excessive governmental central-
ization, and of the exclusion of religious belief from political life all tend both to
overvalue society's pretensions and to undervalue the positive aspects of the specific
institutions under consideration. 2
Powell is not glib about the prospects that contemporary Christian social critics
will achieve sufficient distance from their culture to enable meaningful social
critique. He notes at the outset of his essay that "our comfortable accommodation
with American society long ago became a virtual Babylonian captivity to which
American Christians have willingly submitted our thought and practice."' 3
Christians, he argues, are in a "particularly difficult" position: recovering a sense of
Christian distinctiveness requires an effort that includes withdrawing from culture
in some respects; yet Christian faith requires social engagement for the common
76. Id. at 433.
77. Powell, supra note 22, at 73-74.
78. Id. at 77.
79. Id.
80. Id.; see also id. at 77 n.8 ("'Now those historians judged it a part of honourable freedom not to
keep silence about the evils of their country, which in many places they have been constrained to praise
in terms of the highest eulogy, since they have not another City which is a truer one than theirs, one
whose citizens are chosen for eternity?'") (quoting AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, Book Ill, Chapter 17).
81. Id. at 83-87.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 73.
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good." Nevertheless, he attempts to draw on Augustinian theology to construct an
avenue for social critique that accommodates social engagement while attempting
to avoid either the uncritical celebration or social nihilism that beset classical critics
of Roman society.
The starting point for Powell's critical enterprise is the theological truth that
human beings are creatures designed to find their fulfillment in fellowship with
God. The inherent self-insufficiency of the human condition is further complicated
by human sinfulness." The problem of political ordering is thus "'inextricably
linked with the fundamental issue of what it is to be a creature animated by desire,
whose characteristic marks are lack and hunger, who is made to be this kind of
creature by a central and unforgettable absence, by lack and hunger."" Human
politics is thus "constituted around the reality of what actual human beings love, of
how they respond to their creaturely and fallen lack and hunger.""'
These premises lead Powell to a critical methodology, which he summarizes as
follows: "The primary question to be asked . . . concerns the character of the
society . . . . The society's underlying nature will be shaped and revealed by the
human needs that it identifies and the manner in which it seeks to fulfill them .... "
The critic will then ask about the extent to which "society's forms and institutions
actually achieve temporal peace, avoid violence, relieve suffering, and achieve justice:
In asking this second question, the Augustinian critic will take care to avoid either
uncritical acceptance of the society's pretensions or pseudocritical assumptions about
its moral bankruptcy."" Powell employs this methodology to conclude, for example,
that while there is considerable validity to critiques of "rights talk," such critiques may
be insufficiently radical in that they assume that some adjustment to the employment
of rights discourse will put America "back on" the right course.' But, if American
society is fundamentally oriented toward a "shared commitment to individual acquisi-
tion and 'self-actualization,''. Powell argues that "[t]hose who seek a refuge from
excessive individualism in ... shared values ... will find only that from which they
are fleeing."' Moreover, such critics may underestimate the degree to which "the
language of individual rights is ... the most effective means . . . of raising questions
about social justice and social peace.""
84. Id. at 73-74.
85. Id. at 78. Powell defines human sinfulness as "that primal and pervasive disorientation [i.e.,
away from God] of human existence." Id.
86. Id. (quoting Rowan Williams, Politics and the Soul: A Reading of the "City of God," 19/20
MILLTOWN STUDIES 55, 69 (1987)).
87. Id.
88, Id. at 82.
89. id. at 83.
90. Id. at 84-85.
91. Id. at 85.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 86. Powell offers perhaps surprising appraisals of proposed solutions to the problems of
excessive government centralization and the removal of religion from political life. Rejecting subsidiarity
as a valid theological principle, he argues that no particular governmental structure "has any a priori
claim to Christian support." Id. at 89-90. As a result, the question of whether greater power should be
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As noted above, Part Ill of CPLT provides examples of Christian perspectives
keyed to various doctrinal subjects of law. As is the case in any similar collection,
the quality of the essays varies. Nevertheless, as a group, they lend credence to the
idea that Christian perspectives may make important contributions to legal thought.
Joseph Allegretti's contribution, Can Legal Ethics Be Christian?," asks whether
legal ethics has any need for religion and whether it is "possible to talk about a
Christian legal ethics."'5 Allegretti examines the relationship between Christian
teaching and legal ethics. Borrowing from Daniel Callahan, he argues that legal
ethics needs religion because: (1) religion is an important source of societal
wisdom; (2) ethical discourse becomes too "legalistic" when religion is neglected;
(3) ethics involve the development not only of rules, but also of character and
virtue; and (4) religion can provide perspective from which to question the status
quo.' Christian faith, moreover, contributes distinctively to legal ethics by
providing a specific motivation for ethical conduct and shifting the focus "away
from rules and problems to broader questions of personhood and virtue."'
Allegretti argues that this shift likewise is suggestive of a more narrative approach
to legal ethics teaching." Finally, Allegretti argues that Christianity provides
distinctive points of reference to guide moral choices."
Allegretti's contribution is recognizably Christian, but not necessarily distinctively
so. The first part of his essay focuses on the values of "religion" and draws on an
Aristotelian virtue-ethics critique of rule-based analysis." He concludes by
cautioning that Christian principles "do not eliminate the need for moral reflection,
but they do provide a starting point, as well as a kind of trajectory, for our moral
deliberations.""'.. However useful Allegretti's essay may be for alerting Christians
that "our character and values may put us into conflict with the norms and values
of the wider community, including the legal profession,"" it leaves unaddressed
the relevance of Christian thinking about appropriate lawyering within the liberal,
pluralistic world that lawyers inhabit. Christian ethics may be relevant to lawyers,
but how is it relevant to law (or, more precisely, to the Model Rules)?"
devolved to the states is "strategic or prudential." Id. at 90. Given recent history with habeas corpus
litigation and welfare reform, he argues that in the current context, national power may have important
advantages over state power. Id. at 89-90. He also argues against expressions of "civic religion" by
public officials. Id. at 91.
94. Joseph G. Allegretti, Can Legal Ethics Be Christian?, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECrIVES, supra note
6, at 453, 453.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 454-58.
97. Id. at 461.
98. Id. at 462-64.
99. Id. at 464-69 (citing JAMEs M. GUSTAPSON, CAN ETHics BE CHRISriAN? (1975)).
100. Id. at 454-58.
101. Id. at 465.
102. Id. at 462.
103. For Allegretti's more developed work on these topics, see generally JOSEPH G. ALLEGRETr,
THE LAWYER'S CALUNG (1996).
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Catherine McCauliffs essay, A Historical Perspective on Anglo-American
Contract Law,' argues that "[t]he Christian tradition demands that contract law,
like all law in society, be viewed from the focal point of justice.""lln McCauliff
provides an informative, historical explanation of the relationship between contract
law and Christian theological concepts; but again, one wishes for more specificity
about the relationship between specifically Christian norms of justice and contract
law."'' Is it as simple as placing liability on the party that overreached the
most?"7 How does natural law theory (which McCauliff invokes) recognize a
place for predictability and settled rules?
John Witte, Jr.'s excellent essay, God's Joust, God's Justice: An Illustration from
the History of Marriage Law,'"' begins by affirming the Christian legal historian's
vocation, which Witte argues is "to try to seek God's revelation and judgment over
time without presuming the power of divine judgment.""' Although "[miuch of
what we see in our collective lives comprises the sinful and savage excesses of
corrupt creatures," yet "there is simply too much order in our world, too much
constancy in our habits, too much justice in our norms for us to think that the
course of human events is not somehow channeled by God's providential plan.'"..
The essay historically reconstructs what Witte argues are the four main Western
perspectives on marriage and the family. In legal and social conceptualizations of
the marriage relationship, priority has sometimes been given to the spiritual aspect
of marriage, in which marriage is seen "as a religious or sacramental association,
subject to the creed, code, cult, and canons of the religious community."' At
other times, pride of place has been given to marriage as a social estate or a
voluntary association (a contractual perspective)."' Finally, marriage is sometimes
104. C.M.A. McCauliff, A Historical Perspective on Anglo-American Contract Law, in CHRISTIAN
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 6, at 470.
105. Id. at 470. McCauliff defines justice in the Christian tradition as "a complex tapestry of
principles woven from many historical periods - classical antiquity, medieval Christendom, the
Reformation, the Enlightenment, and our own period." Id.
106. Even so, McCauliff deserves credit for putting the ideal of justice on the table in the face of
contemporary skepticism. In the Foreword to CPLT, Harold Berman tells the following story about his
last law school class at Yale in the 1940s:
[lit was in June 1947 . . . when Professor Eugene Rostow, in the course in corporate
finance, somehow brought the discussion around to the day's news of the failure of a
South Carolina grand jury to indict persons charged with carrying out the lynching of a
black man, though the evidence against them was overwhelming. "Is that justice?"
Professor Rostow asked. "What is justice?" I remember it particularly because it was the
first time the word justice had been mentioned in any of the courses I had taken during
three years of law study.
Harold Berman, Foreword, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 6, at xi, xi-xii.
107. 1 am indebted to David Vernon for this phrase.
108. John Witte, Jr., God's Joust, God's Justice: An Illustration from the History of Marriage Law,
in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 6, at 406.
109. Id. at 409.
110. Id. at 408-09.
Ill. Id. at 411.
112. Id. ("A social perspective treats the family as a social estate, subject to special state laws of
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regarded in a naturalist perspective "that treats the family as a created or natural
institution, subject to natural laws.'" Witte argues that although these perspec-
tives are complementary, they "have also come to stand in considerable tension ....
for they are linked to competing claims of ultimate authority over the form and
function of marriage."" 4
The body of Witte's essay traces the initial primacy of the Catholic emphasis on
marriage's spiritual or sacramental nature prior to the sixteenth century, the
dominance of Catholic and Protestant models (either as a hybrid or separately)
between the sixteenth and nineteenth century, and the emergence of an Enlighten-
ment (contractually oriented) perspective in the nineteenth century."' Witte's
articulation of the theology and anthropology implicit in the now-prevailing
Enlightenment visions of marriage is helpful not only in understanding the trends
toward privatization in modern marriage and family law, but also its intellectual
roots. While "[tihe achievements of the Enlightenment in reforming the traditional
theology and law of marriage cannot be lost on us," Witte argues that "we must
resist the temptation to reduce marriage to a single perspective, or to a single
forum.""..6 He states that
[b]oth Catholic and Protestant traditions have seen that a marriage is at
once a natural, religious, social, and contractual unit; that in order to
survive and flourish, this institution must be governed both externally
by legal authorities and internally by moral authorities. From different
perspectives, these traditions have seen that marriage is an inherently
communal enterprise, in which marital couples, magistrates, and
ministers must all inevitably cooperate. After all, marital contracts are
of little value without courts to enforce them. Marital properties are of
little use without laws to protect them. Marital laws are of little
consequence without canons to inspire them. Marital customs are of
little cogency without natural narratives to ground them."7
Part of the significance of Witte's contribution is the careful attention he devotes to
law and history. Although his scholarship is theologically sensitive and clearly
reflects his worldview, Witte's primary focus is on learning about law and history.
In a similar vein, Robert Cochran's essay, Tort Law and Intermediate Com-
munities,"' illustrates how theologically sensitive scholarship can illuminate
traditional legal doctrine. Cochran begins by noting the place of "intermediate
contract, property, and inheritance and to the expectations and exactions of the local community. A
contractual perspective describes the family as a voluntary association, subject to the wills and
preferences of the couple, their children, their dependents, their household.").
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 412-20.
116. Id. at 421.
117. Id.
118. Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Tort Law and Intermediate Communities: Calvinist and Catholic
Insights, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 6, at 486.
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communities" in both Calvinist and Catholic thought."" He then notes that these
communities point to little-noticed pockets of tort law that are exceptional in that
they are not aimed at individual conduct. Thus, he observes, intermediate
communities have traditionally received special protection (though decreasingly so)
through various immunities, and they are becoming the object of judicially imposed
duties to act affirmatively to protect individual welfare.' He then argues that
policy makers should be more aware of the ways in which tort law can needlessly
impair the flourishing of intermediate communities.'
The selections in CPLT dealing with conventional legal subjects display similar
strengths and suffer from similar weaknesses. The essays are, in general,
worthwhile in that they offer an evaluation of the subject area from a recognizably
Christian perspective. The main weakness in these contributions is their failure to
articulate a faith-informed understanding of the role of law and its relationship to
Christian ethics. As the next section of this review explains, this weakness is not
surprising.
ill. Recovering Christian Legal Thought
If one goal of CPLT is to open the way for legal scholarship that is specifically
informed by Christian faith, another is certainly to provide a background resource
for law students and scholars. Indeed, CPLT will be of use to Christian scholars and
law students regardless of whether Christian legal scholarship becomes an accepted
feature of the academic mainstream. Christian law students are often baffled as they
attempt to relate what they learn in law school to a Christian worldview. If my own
experience in law school is representative, most law students have never heard any
of their law teachers identify themselves as Christians, much less heard any of them
make an argument about law that depended overtly on faith-based presuppositions
about the world. Nor, for the most part, are the presuppositions underlying
classroom approaches to legal thinking often considered with sufficient specificity
for students to identify points of convergence or departure with respect to their own
thinking.
CPLT is thus likely to be quite useful to law students and scholars in positioning
contemporary legal thought relative to Christian faith. As already noted, this
"positioning" occurs along two dimensions. Part I of CPLT considers contemporary
jurisprudential movements such as liberalism, law and economics, critical legal
studies, feminism, and critical race theory from Christian perspectives. Part U is an
effort to assist Christian scholars in recovering the long history of Christian
reflection on law and politics.
119. Id. at 487-90. Intermediate communities are "the families, religious congregations, and other
associations that stand between the individual and the state." Id. at 486.
120. Id. at 493-96.
121. Id. at 496-504.
122. This is not to say that law professors do not regularly make arguments that rest upon
controversial fundamental presuppositions or, perhaps unwittingly, presuppose that the world has a given
order and intelligibility.
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The essays in Part H1 of CPLT are organized around the taxonomy of the
relationship between culture and Christian faith developed by Richard Niebuhr in
his well-known 1951 book Christ and Culture." Niebuhr divided the various
Christian traditions' perspectives as follows: Christ above culture (synthesists),'
Christ transforming culture (conversionists), Christ against culture (separatists),
Christ and culture in paradox (dualists), and the Christ of culture (culturalists).'"
CPLTs editors have used Niebuhr's taxonomy to arrange the essays in a way that
summarizes some of the key differences and similarities between Catholic
(synthesist), Calvinist (conversionist), Baptist and Anabaptist (separatist), and
Lutheran (dualist) views of the relationship between Christianity and law or church
and state. "
The essays in Part II are likely to be quite helpful to the reader who needs an
introduction to Christian political theology. Most of these essays provide a
systematic and well-executed, if rudimentary, overview of the political theology of
each writer's faith tradition.'" Unfortunately, a twenty-page essay cannot both
introduce the reader to centuries of a particular tradition's theological reflections on
law and politics and also engage important features of the contemporary
jurisprudential landscape.
123. H. RICHARD NIEBUHR, CHRIST AND CULTURE (1951). Niebuhr's taxonomy is probably the
best known, but it has its competitors. See, e.g., A. JAMES REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC
LIFE 9-52 (1985). It also has its critics. See, e.g., STANLEY HAUERWAS & WILLIAM H. WILLIMON,
RESIDENT ALIENS 39-43 (1989) (arguing that Niebuhr's taxonomy creates a "false ... dilemma of
whether to be in or out of the world, politically responsible or introspectively irresponsible"). In a
similar, though less openly critical vein, Robert Cochran seeks to reconcile Niebuhr's various perspec-
tives. See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Christian Traditions, Culture and Law, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES,
supra note 6, at 242, 250-52.
124. Robert Cochran describes this viewpoint as "Christ plus culture" because, in his view, Niebuhr's
label "is too easily misunderstood as one of Christ controlling culture." Cochran, supra note 123, at 243.
The terminology may make more sense to readers if they substitute "Christian faith" for "Christ."
125. See NIEBUHR, supra note 123.
126. There is no separate contribution representing Niebuhr's fifth category (culturalist) because
Niebuhr thought that a culturalist would presumably have nothing special to say about a given culture's
law, politics, or culture. See Cochran, supra note 123, at 248. But see Berman, supra note 106, at xiii
("Can we not say that God has revealed Himself in existing legal institutions, and that he continues to
reveal Himself in the development of those institutions, insofar as they reflect justice and mercy and
good faith?").
127. See, e.g., Gerard V. Bradley, Natural Law, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 6, at 277
(Catholic natural law theory); Angela C. Carmella, A Catholic View of Law and Justice, in CHRISTIAN
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 6, at 255-76 (Catholic social teaching); Caudill. supra note 42 (Dutch Calvinist
legal philosophy); Timothy L. Hall, "Incendiaries of Commonwealths": Baptists and Law, in CHRISTIAN
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 6, at 340 (Baptist political theology); David M. Smolin, A House Divided?:
Anabaptist and Lutheran Perspectives on the Sword, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIvES, supra note 6, at 370
(Anabaptist and Lutheran perspectives). Other essays in Part I focus more narrowly. See Marie A.
Failinger & Patrick R. Keifert, Making Our Home in the Works of God: Lutherans on the Civil Use of
the Law, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECIVES, supra note 6, at 386; Hamilton, supra note 65; Thomas L. Shaffer,
The Radical Reformation and the Jurisprudence of Forgiveness, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECIVES. supra note
6, at 321.
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Indeed, more than any other section in the book, this section evidences the
marginalization of Christian belief in academic discourse during the past century.
The average law student or professor may be expected to know something about
economic analysis, liberal political theory, feminism, or postmodern theories of
interpretation, but is likely to know next to nothing about Christian theology, even
key elements in his own religious tradition.'5" These essays will help fill that gap
and also provide a general roadmap for deeper investigation.
The bad news for Christian legal scholars (and the good news) is that a vast
amount of work remains. To live in modern America, especially to live in the
circles that tend to produce law students and law professors, is to live with a deep
indoctrination into particular ways of thinking about the world, ways of thinking
that for all their diversity nevertheless have in common an indebtedness to both
secularism and liberalism. The process of recovering the heritage of Christian
thinking is important not because there is some golden age of Christian thought to
which one ought to return, but rather because modem minds - modem Christian
minds - are unpracticed at thinking about "worldly" matters in such a way as to
take God's existence seriously.
Indeed, some of the essays in CPLT that purport to consider contemporary legal
movements from a Christian perspective display more intellectual indebtedness to
the relevant modem (or postmodern) movement than to Christian belief. Stephen
Bainbridge, for example, in a spirited defense of the law and economics movement,
acknowledges the moral force of the standard objections to the use of economic
theory in policymaking'" He nevertheless argues vigorously that "legal
institutions are more effective when they promote wealth maximization than when
promoting wealth redistribution."' Although Bainbridge buttresses his argument
briefly with a Calvinist defense of the limited state,' his main argument is
prudential: the problems of incorporating "Other Justice" norms in the legal process
are simply too great, whether we introduce such norms as external values that
judges may consider in the judicial process or we incorporate such norms as part
of a broadened welfare-economics approach.'
Burlette Carter's essay on critical race theory is also, at least by appearances,
more influenced by critical race theory than by theology. Carter uses theological
sources in two ways. First, based upon a topical survey of articles in law journals
128. For an insightful explanation of why this is particularly likely to be true of evangelicals, see
MARK A. NOLL, THE SCANDAL OF THE EVANGELICAL MIND (1994).
129. Two recent and particularly important attempts at recovering distinctively theological
perspectives are MILBANK, supra note 14, and OLIVER O'DONOvAN, THE DESIRE OF THE NATIONS
(1996).
130. Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 209.
131. Id. at 213.
132. Id. at 214-15.
133. Id. at 213-14. Bainbridge argues that legislatures are better equipped than courts to make
decisions about wealth distribution, and that welfare economics cannot be broadened to take account of
"Other Justice" norms without being rendered overly indeterminate. Id. His essay also includes a
sophisticated economic and theological defense of rational choice theory. See id. at 216-23. No doubt,
Professor Bainbridge would also argue that prudence and theology are not necessarily enemies.
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and in theology journals, she finds that both sources ignored or downplayed race
issues prior to the hiring of African-American faculty members."N The sig-
nificance of these patterns for Carter is that many writers have defined what counts
as important scholarship according to white standards. 3
She next draws on the commandment to "Love your neighbor as yourself"' and
Jesus' exposition of it in the parable of the Good Samaritan 37 to "connect [her
comments on race] to the concept of Christian love.""' For Carter, "get[ting] on
with the business of being Good Samaritans" means, "in legal terms, to arrive at a
true vision of equality under the law."'3  To do this, "we need a broader understan-
ding of how group prejudice operates in our lives."'' " Regrettably, Carter does not
elaborate on the theological basis for these jurisprudential conclusions; they are
presented as self-evident truths. Less controversially (perhaps because the parable's
application to personal conduct is more straightforward), she concludes that
"[wlithout denying the reality of race in America, . . we must learn to celebrate
the heroes who every day violate group injunctions by shuttling acts of kindness
across racial lines."''
Conclusion: The Future of Christian Legal Scholarship
As this review suggests, CPLTs editors and contributors have done Christian
lawyers, law students, and academics a great service in being courageous enough to
speak openly about some of the implications of faith for legal discourse. CPLTs
efforts to promote the recovery of Christian thinking about law are likely to be
immensely helpful to many within the American legal community. Moreover, the
essays set a generally high standard for responsible faith-based scholarship. It may be
inevitable that perspectival scholarship (i.e., all scholarship) will sometimes seem
inaccessible or even incomprehensible to particular listeners in a particular scholarly
134. Carter, supra note 20, at 136-42.
135. Carter states that
white writers wrote from their own racial perspective, and in their experience, racism
directed against people of color, though perhaps intellectually disturbing, had no perceived
direct negative effects on their lives. Perhaps the benefits of racism for the white majority
made the pain it brought to victims' lives difficult to see or easy to rationalize; perhaps
the widespread acceptance of dominant modes of scholarly discourse among whites
rendered challenging those modes too lonely a course. Thus the fact of these writers'
whiteness determined what subjects did and did not receive the benefits of their efforts
and, moreover, what approaches they would take in their work. This principle seems to
hold true whether or not these writers actually ever consciously thought a single racist
thought - in other words, the principle is true irrespective of whether they individually
harbored any specific racist intent.
Id. at 142-43.
136. Matthew 22:39 (NIV).
137. Luke 10:25-37 (NIV).
138. Carter, supra note 20, at 135.
139. Id. at 147.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 148.
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community at a particular time, but we should certainly not regard this necessity as
a virtue. And, indeed, inaccessibility is all the more to be lamented if nothing in
particular has been added to the relevant discipline at the end of the day. CPLTs
contributors deserve credit for their concern on these fronts.
That said, CPLT also raises a number of paradoxes that confront Christian scholars.
The first relates to the relationship between Christian faith and the general demise of
Enlightenment epistemologies. Christians ought to be delighted about postmodemity's
easing of Enlightenment entry barriers into academic discourse,' 2 and they may also
find other aspects of postmodern thought worthy of approval. Because Christianity
begins with the presupposition that human beings are finite creatures whose reason is
not only limited but also affected by moral fallenness, Christian scholars may readily
concede that mere mortals lack the objectivity attributed to them by the Enlightenment.
They may also appreciate other aspects of some postmodern writers' work, such as its
concern for justice for the oppressed and the abuse of power relations." 3
Nevertheless, as Alan Jacobs has noted, "as common ground goes, . . . an anti-
Enlightenment view of rationality doesn't constitute a particularly expansive patch."'"
It would be ironic were Christianity to shed its second-class status in the academic
world because of the triumph of new ideologies purporting to welcome 4S a great
variety of perspectives only because these new ideologies generally agree that no
perspective can possibly be true. Christians may thus find themselves between two
worlds - finding common ground with scholars of other persuasions who are
interested in discovering "the way things are," while simultaneously affirming that
humans do not possess the capacity for objective description."
142. See Diogenes Allen, The End o'tthe Modern World, 22 CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR'S REV. 339 (1993).
143. As Alvin Plantinga has written:
For example, postmodems typically reject classical foundationalism, which has also been
rejected ... in anticipatory fashion by Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin, and Edwards....
Many other themes of postmodemism can elicit only enthusiastic applause from a
Christian perspective: one thinks of sympathy and compassion for the poor and oppressed,
the strong sense of outrage at some of the injustices our world displays, celebration of
diversity, and the 'unmasking' of prejudice. oppression, and power-seeking masquerading
as self-evident moral principle and the dictates of sweet reason. Another theme on which
Christian and postmodern can heartily agree is the way in which, even in the best of us,
our vision of what is right and wrong, true or false, is often clouded and covered over by
self-interest. True, postmoderns tend to see these beams in the eyes of others, not in their
own; but in this they don't differ from the rest of us, including Christians.
PLANTINGA, supra note 39, at 423-24.
144. Alan Jacobs, A Tale of Two Stanleys, FIRST THINGS, June 1994, at 18, 19.
145. One might question whether such a stance would be welcoming or merely patronizing.
146. George Marsden argues that
Christians and other believers who reject the dominant naturalistic biases in the academy
would be foolish to do so in the name of postmodern relativism. What they should be
arguing is that the contemporary academy on its own termv has no consistent grounds for
rejecting all religious perspectives. If postmodernists who denounce scientific objectivism
as an illusion are well accepted in the contemporary academy, there is little justification
for the same academy to continue to suppress religious perspectives because they are
"unscientific." Christians, however, need to challenge relativistic postmodern anti-realist
naturalism just as much as the older objectivist naturalism. Both these parties start with
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A second paradox relates to the role of belief disclosure in legal scholarship. As
noted above, one of the recurring themes in CPLT is that all scholarship is perspec-
tival. s4' One of the arguments found in CPLT is that disclosure of underlying
philosophical presuppositions can facilitate scholarly communication." But, it is also
true that, as a practical matter, belief disclosure can sometimes impede deliberation.
It is important to understand, for example, the relationship between one's worldview
and liberal democratic institutions. Liberal democratic institutions, however, can be
(and are) taken for granted in American political life without the necessity of agreeing
on a theoretical account of their origins and virtues." A similar observation may be
made about everyday legal discourse. A wide variety of scholars may be able to
affirm common principles (e.g., "courts should interpret statutes in accordance with
theory x"; "we should not waste resources"; "power relations affect a society's
conception of what counts as 'neutrality' or 'fairness') without raising the rhetorical
stakes by seeking agreement at a deeper level. This sort of discourse is presumably
an everyday feature of academic and political life, whether the discussion is between
a Kantian liberal and a Posnerian pragmatist or a Presbyterian Christian and an
Orthodox Jew. Speakers must make practical judgments about when to press
underlying disagreements, and these judgments will vary according to the objectives
being pursued.
Finally, CPLTs editors have rightly argued that there are a number of reasons why
people who are not Christians ought to be interested in CPLT and in scholarship by
Christians and other people of faith. The editors were appropriately concerned with
demonstrating the potential relevance of Christian legal scholarship and attempting to
dispel expectations that it would be a simplistic, univocal, right-wing enterprise.
Paradoxically, however, the most important contribution most Christian scholars could
currently make to the church and the academy may turn out to be doing scholarship
that seems "uninteresting" or "irrelevant" to some. Again, obscurity is not something
to be sought for its own sake. But, if Christian perspectives are to provide a
distinctive voice, Christian scholars must have a theologically informed understanding
of the relationship between Christian faith and the structure of the most important
currents of contemporary thought. Recognizably Christian voices have been in such
short supply for so long that gaining such an understanding is a daunting task,
especially given that their education (legal and otherwise) will often provide Christian
scholars with little assistance in this task. Unless this hard work is done, Christian
purely naturalistic assumptions and make these normative for good scholarship. Christians
need to challenge these assumptions and to suggest that scholarship might just as
responsibly take place within the framework of the assumptions that God has created an
ordered reality. Far from being relativistic, this is a claim that our experience makes best
sense if we realize that we are in a universe of truths sustained by God, even if humans
can glimpse these truths only imperfectly.
MARSDEN, supra note 8. at 30-3 1.
147. See supra Part I.A.
148. See Caudill, supra note 24, at 111-12.
149. Differences about their origins and virtues will shape the specific arrangements that scholars
will advocate.
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scholarship will merely be a "baptized" version of some other (more influential) strand
of legal analysis."
Another way of making this point is to say that what is badly needed are rigorous
accounts of the relevance of various Christian traditions to some of the main questions
confronting legal analysis - works that would help Christians develop coherent
internal perspectives about law from which they could comment more generally. Part
II of CPLT provides some helpful gestures in this direction, but there are relatively
few contemporary works,'' apart from those written by Catholic natural law
scholars,"n that systematically address key questions of jurisprudence such as
authority, legitimacy, obligation, rights, and consequentialism. As a result, Christian
scholars tend to "borrow," perhaps unconsciously, key elements of systems whose
presuppositions may sometimes be quite foreign to the writer's own explicit faith
commitment. Producing works that analyze these foundational questions is a critical
first step if a more meaningful Christian jurisprudence of contracts, torts, or
administrative law is to materialize.
Indeed, in my judgment, part of the considerable service CPLT has done in opening
the conversation about Christian legal scholarship is to suggest the possibility of future
scholarship that is influenced even more profoundly by Christian faith. God has been
dead in the legal academy for so long that it may take some doing to remember that
He is there.
150. At the end of the day, people of faith will necessarily be part of various "parties" within the
academic community. See No GOD BUT GOD (Os Guinness & John Seel eds., 1992).
151. One might cite works of Harold Berman, Stephen Carter, Jefferson Powell, and Thomas
Shaffer, among others, as notable counterexamples.
152. The most obvious example is FINNIS, supra note 14.
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